By José Carlos Palma*
The weaponization and militarization of space have been ongoing for many years among nations with space-faring capabilities. The term “space weaponization” refers to the use of weapons in, from, or towards space, while “space militarization” pertains to the utilization of space-based assets for military purposes, such as surveillance and communication. The race to develop space weapons began in the 1950s between the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union, shortly after the launch of the first satellite, Sputnik-1. This caused global alarm, leading to the creation of the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty (OST) around 1967. Although the treaty prohibits the placement of Weapons of Mass Destruction in space or celestial bodies, it remains silent on conventional weapons, creating a loophole that is currently being exploited for the weaponization of space. Other agreements like the Moon Treaty or the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) have either been silent on the matter or have not garnered widespread acceptance. Proposals such as the Sino-Russian Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and Threat (PPWT), the European Space Agency’s ‘Code,’ and the US Artemis Accords have also made limited progress. China is not only striving to catch up in the space race but also aiming to set future standards.
China’s space program traces its origins back to the second artillery regiment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), now known as the Rocket Forces (PLARF). Unlike India, where civilian (ISRO) and military (DRDO) space activities have been managed separately, China’s space program was initiated under the PLA in the 1950s. The Long-March 1 (LM-1/CZ-1) and LM-2 LEO (Low Earth Orbit) satellite launch vehicles were modified versions of China’s Dong Feng 3 IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) and the DF-5 ICBM.
China’s space program is deeply intertwined with its national objectives. In addition to achieving prosperity (referred to as the Chinese dream or fuqiang), the national objective emphasizes war fighting and winning. Space plays an increasingly pivotal role in China’s national security strategy. China perceives the US’ overwhelming space capabilities as an undue advantage that needs to be neutralized before it can regain lost territories within the First Island Chain and dominate the Second Island Chain and beyond into the Pacific. China also sees space as an area where it must establish its presence and surpass the US in comprehensive competition. Furthermore, China aims to exploit space resources. These objectives are to be achieved by the 2049 deadline set by Xi Jinping for the Chinese dream.
The establishment of the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) as an independent branch of the PLA in 2015 has given a significant boost to space warfare, aligning with China’s vision of conducting “informatized” wars of the future.
China began taking space seriously around the turn of the new millennium, closely studying US tactics in Operation Desert Storm. The first task undertaken by China’s weaponization project was the development of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons to disable the vast number of US satellites. China conducted tests for a Direct Ascent ASAT weapon, Dong Neng-1, between 2005 and 2006, and a successful test took place in 2007 when it destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite. An upgraded version, Dong Neng-2, was tested in 2013 for a non-destructive test on a geostationary satellite. Dong Neng-2 is expected to be operational.
China has also been working on “parasitic microsatellites” that can be released from another satellite in orbit and collide with other on-orbit satellites. Even small debris, as small as 10 cm, can destroy a satellite at high speeds, as demonstrated by the incident involving RISAT-1 in 2016. These microsatellites, weighing just a few kilograms, offer a relatively inexpensive yet effective alternative to ground-based ASAT weapons. They can be equipped with intelligence to accurately identify and destroy enemy satellites.
China is also developing ground-based Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), including lasers, which can direct concentrated electromagnetic energy from Earth to satellites, disrupting their operations, particularly their earth-observation sensors. There are also plans for space-based DEWs. DEWs can temporarily disable (dazzle), permanently damage (blind), or even destroy space assets.
China is expected to have space-based chemical laser weapons within a year. These co-orbital lasers have advantages over ground-based DEWs as they require less power and can achieve greater accuracy. China is also researching space-based microwave jammers that would interfere with the communication payloads of enemy satellites. Additionally, chemical sprays capable of damaging sensors or solar panels, rendering satellites inoperative, are being developed. China claims to have developed a powerful Klystron Amplifier, capable of generating high-power microwaves, for use in co-orbital payloads to jam signals from an adversary’s satellites.
In August 2021, China conducted a test of a new class of space-based weapons called the hypersonic Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS). The Soviet Union developed FOBS in the 1960s to penetrate the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) of the US at their most vulnerable points. The US did not overemphasize the threat at the time, and it faded away by the 1980s, although the FOBS appeared to violate the then-emerging OST. While China’s August 2021 test missed the target by a considerable margin, a previous test earlier that year was successful. The FOBS weapon allows only a few minutes of reaction time for ABMs, unlike traditional ICBMs.
China’s rapid technological advancements in space-related activities also raise concerns about the dual-use nature of these technologies. Techniques such as Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO), which are used for tasks like docking and space debris removal, can also be used for inspecting and gathering intelligence on enemy space assets or for co-orbital anti-satellite capabilities. Robotic arms, as demonstrated by Intelsat in 2020 for mission extension of low-fuel satellites, can also serve offensive purposes. This highlights the increasing importance of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) for major space-faring nations like India to safeguard their space assets.
The PLASSF is responsible for conducting electronic warfare (EW), which involves acquiring or interfering with an adversary’s electronic transmissions. It encompasses ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) and COMINT/SIGINT (Communication/Signal Intelligence). ELINT involves mapping electromagnetic emissions from enemy land, aircraft carriers, or airborne early-warning systems, while SIGINT involves intercepting electronic communications among various enemy entities. Chinese satellites, such as the TJS-series, serve as ELINT satellites located in GEO and early-warning systems capable of detecting missile launches using infrared (IR) seekers.
China also operates various intelligence-gathering satellites. The Yaogan satellites, known by their military designation Jianbing, consist of a large number of diverse satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radars (SARs) and electro-optical (EO) sensors. SAR Yaogan satellites operate in polar orbits, providing resolutions better than one meter. The Yaogan-30 Ocean Surveillance Satellites are launched in triplets in close proximity to detect Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) through signal intelligence and triangulation. These satellites coordinate ground-launched DF-21D/DF-26B missiles and ship-launched YJ-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles (AShBMs) to target CBGs, serving as a backbone for implementing Area Denial/Access Denial (A2/D2) strategies in the First and Second Island Chains. It is believed that China will eventually operate 18 triplets of these satellites to provide continuous surveillance of the Pacific and the Indo-China Sea to counter American Nuclear Aircraft Carriers (CVNs).
China has followed in the footsteps of the United States and Russia in developing its space assets and weapon technologies. The Chinese space developments raise concerns due to their opaque nature and the country’s hegemonic ambitions rooted in a millennia-old Middle Kingdom belief system. As an irredentist neighbor that has engaged in military conflicts in the past, it is crucial for us to be cautious of China’s space weapon capabilities and develop offensive space capabilities within our Defense Space Agency (DSA).
* Expert in international relations, such as foreign policy, international trade, domestic security, international security, developing nations, domestic security, intelligence, IT Consultant, world history, political consultant, and military analysis.