Inside the Clash: The Battle of Conoco Plant (Special Forces vs Special Forces) – A Tactical Analysis
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By José Carlos Palma*

Feature image courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps

On February 7, 2018, approximately 500 to 600 pro-Syrian forces composed of Syrian Army infantry and a few hundred Russian mercenaries attacked a US JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) outpost using artillery, tanks, and APCs in the assault. The ‘mercenaries’ were believed to have been composed of members of a Russian private military organization known as ‘The Wagner Group’. The Wagner Group has been used in the past by the Russian government to conduct special operations they don’t want Moscow associated with directly. However, they are known to train at Russian bases, are composed mainly of former Spetsnaz, and are believed to be ‘advised’ by active duty Spetsnaz to an unknown degree. It would not be unfair to call them a Special Operations Force.

Before the battle, the forces developing against the US camp were overheard on radios communicating routinely in Russian and were known after the battle to have left Syria and reported directly to Moscow. They also used EW (electronic warfare) assets before and during the battle that are known to be the sole proprietary assets of the Russian military. It did not go well for them.

Though the attacking troops and their artillery and armor were seen massing in a nearby town days before the assault, there was no indication that an attack on the American outpost, in particular, would take place. Normally great care is taken to keep Russian and US forces from clashing directly in Syria.

A team of about 30 Delta Force soldiers, Rangers from the Joint Special Operations Command were working alongside Kurdish and Arab forces at a small dusty outpost next to a Conoco gas plant, near the city of Deir al-Zour.

Roughly 20 miles away, at a base known as a mission support site, a team of Green Berets and a platoon of infantry Marines watched drone feeds and passed information to the Americans at the gas plant about the gathering fighters.

At about 1500 hrs., the Syrian force began moving toward the Conoco plant. By early evening, more than 500 troops and 27 vehicles (made up of tanks and APCs) had amassed.

In the American air operations center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and at the Pentagon, military officers and intelligence analysts watched the scene unfold. Commanders briefed American pilots and ground crews in support of the US forces in Syria, and air assets were placed on alert.

Back at the mission support site, the Green Berets and Marines were preparing a small reaction force, consisting of roughly 16 troops in four mine-resistant vehicles, to support the Conoco plant if they were needed.

At about 2030 hrs., three Russian-made T-72 tanks moved within a mile of the Conoco plant. Bracing for an attack, the Green Berets prepared to launch the reaction force.

At the Conoco plant, American SOF troops watched a column of tanks and other armored vehicles turn and drive toward them around 2000 hrs. from a neighborhood of houses where they had tried to gather undetected.

At about 2030 hrs., the Russian mercenaries and Syrian forces struck.

The Conoco outpost was hit with a mixture of tank fire, large artillery, and mortar rounds. The air was filled with dust and shrapnel. The American SOF operators took cover, then ran behind dirt berms to fire anti-tank missiles and machine guns at the advancing column of armored vehicles.

For the first 15 minutes, American military officials called their Russian counterparts and urged them to stop the attack. When that failed, American troops fired warning shots at a group of vehicles and a howitzer.

The attackers were not deterred.

Soon American CloseAir Support aircraft began arriving in waves, including Reaper drones, F-22 stealth fighter jets, F-15E Strike Fighters, B-52 bombers, AC-130 gunships, and AH-64 Apache helicopters. For the next three hours, dozens of American air assets pummeled enemy troops, tanks, and other vehicles. Marine rocket artillery was fired from the ground.

The reaction team sped toward the fight. It was dark, and the roads were littered with felled power lines and shell craters. The 20-mile drive was made all the more difficult since the trucks did not turn on their headlights, relying solely on thermal-imaging cameras to navigate.

As the Green Berets and Marines neared the Conoco plant around 11:30 p.m., they were forced to stop. The barrage of artillery was too dangerous to drive through until airstrikes silenced the enemy’s howitzers and tanks.

At the plant, the commandos were pinned down by enemy artillery and running low on ammunition. Flashes from tank muzzles, antiaircraft weapons, and machine guns lit up the air.

At about 0100 hrs. with the Syrian artillery fire finally dwindling from the constant US air assault, the team of Marines and Green Berets pulled up to the Conoco outpost and began firing. At that point in the battle, most of the air assets had returned to their bases to refuel and re-arm.

The United States JSOC troops, allied Syrian troops, and Marines….roughly 50 in all…. prepared for direct fire engagement as the Russian mercenaries left their vehicles and headed toward the JSOC outpost on foot in full-on frontal assault.

A handful of Marines ran ammunition to machine guns and Javelin missile launchers scattered along the berms and wedged among the trucks. Some of the Green Berets and Marines aimed exposed hatches of their vehicles. Others remained in their trucks, using a combination of thermal screens and joystick to control and fire the heavy machine guns affixed on their roofs.

A few of the US troops, including Air Force combat controllers, worked the radios to direct the next fleet of bombers flying toward the battlefield. At least one Marine exposed himself to incoming fire as he used a missile guidance computer to find targets’ locations in the dark and pass them on to the troops calling in follow-on airstrikes.

The Russian mercenaries were effectively massacred in the battle.

An hour later, they started to retreat and the American troops stopped firing. From their outpost, the Special Operators and Marines watched the mercenaries and Syrian fighters return to collect their dead. The small team of American troops suffered no harm in the battle. One allied Syrian fighter was wounded.

What the Russians leading the attack had failed to appreciate was the US forces’ combat experience and expertise in battlefield management. They also turned out to be inept at countering US air assets. They thought it would be a cakewalk given their armor, artillery, and outnumbering the US Special operators more than ten to one. It was a lesson I’m sure the survivors will not soon forget.


* Expert in international relations, such as foreign policy, international trade, domestic security, international security, developing nations, domestic security, intelligence, IT Consultant, world history, political consultant, and military analysis.

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