History
The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, highlighted the need within the US Department of Defense for reform and reorganization. The US Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer, had already helped create the U.S. Delta Force in 1977. Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate Army SOF units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.
By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the US Congress of the need for military reforms. In June, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). With concern mounting on Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF. The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, Lynn Rylander, both advocated SOF reforms.
At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul the United States Special Operations Forces. They included Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and William Cohen (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country’s capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem. Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with low-intensity conflicts.
In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled “Defense Organization: The Need For Change.” James R. Locher III, the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. By the spring of 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations. Representative Daniel’s proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the US Secretary of Defense; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.
Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led the Pentagon’s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a three-star general. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a four-star general in charge to give SOF more influence. Several retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform. By most accounts, retired Army Major General Richard Scholtes gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force during Operation Urgent Fury, explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties. After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in Grenada.
Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called “SOF checkbook”). The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the Reagan administration regarding what it saw as past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation. The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.
However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, whose principal duties included the monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador Charles Whitehouse assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).
Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General James Lindsay, had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM.
President Ronald Reagan approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.
Operation Earnest Will
USSOCOM’s first tactical operation involved 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (“Night Stalkers”) aviators, SEALs, and Special Boat Teams (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During Operation Earnest Will, the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq War. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted Kuwait to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks. The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop Iran, which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August. The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern Persian Gulf to thwart clandestine Iranian mining and small boat attacks.
On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and Little Birds took off from the frigate USS Jarrett to track an Iranian ship, Iran Ajr. The Nightstalkers observed Iran Ajr turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As Iran Ajr’s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel’s deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.
Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the Iranian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters, and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker Sea Isle City near the oil terminal outside Kuwait City. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack. During Operation Nimble Archer, four destroyers shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third platform 2 miles (3 km) away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes.
On 14 April 1988, 65 miles (100 km) east of Bahrain, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull. Ten sailors were injured. During Operation Praying Mantis, the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate Sahand and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields. After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform. Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States. Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran’s small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the Mark V Special Operations Craft.
Somalia
Special Operations Command first became involved in Somalia in 1992 as part of Operation Provide Relief. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope. The first team into Somalia was CIA Special Activities Division paramilitary officers with elements of JSOC. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations before the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named Larry Freedman. Freedman was awarded the Intelligence Star for “extraordinary heroism” for his actions.
The earliest missions during Operation Restore Hope were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for Marines. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick. When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for President George Bush during a visit to Somalia. In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR’s mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over 26,000 miles (42,000 km), captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over 45,320 pounds (20,560 kg) of explosives.
In August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s supporters upon U.S. and UN forces. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger was charged with a mission named Operation Gothic Serpent to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground, after several Lockheed AC-130 air raids and UN assaults on his strongholds.
While Marines from the 24th MEU provided an interim QRF (Force Recon Det and helicopters from HMM-263), the task force arrived in the country and began training exercises. The Marines were asked to take on the Aidid snatch mission, but having the advantage of being in the area for more than two months, decided after mission analysis that the mission was a “no-go” due to several factors, centered around the inability to rescue the crew of a downed helicopter (re: the indigenous forces technique of using RPGs against helicopters and blocking the narrow streets to restrict the movement of a ground rescue force). This knowledge was not passed on to the Rangers, due to the Marines operating from the USS Wasp and the Rangers remaining on land. TF Ranger was made up of operators from Delta Force, 75th Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, SEALs from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, and Air Force special tactics units. During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions in Mogadishu, all of which were successes. Although Aidid remained free, the effect of these missions seriously limited his movements.
On 3 October, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid’s stronghold the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours. Helicopters carried an assault and a ground convoy of security teams launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire, more intense than during previous missions. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid’s lieutenants and were loading them onto the convoy trucks when a MH-60 Blackhawk was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). A small element from the security forces, as well as an MH-6 assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site. The battle became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than 1 mile (1.6 km) to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation. A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. At about this time, the mission’s quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by the Somali fire and required the fire support of two AH-6 helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.
The assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so as not to be pinned down by the very heavy enemy fire while treating their wounded and worked to free the pilot’s body from the downed helicopter. With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties and sustaining substantial damage to their vehicles.
Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, 10th Mountain Division soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, Pakistan Army tanks, and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, finally arrived at 1:55 am on 4 October. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot’s body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night. All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot. AH-6 gunships raked the streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the Pakistani Stadium compound for the QRF at 6:30 am, thus concluding one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000. Although Task Force Ranger’s few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because the Task Force failed to complete their stated mission, capturing Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia was completed in March 1995. Even though Operation Gothic Serpent failed, USSOCOM still made significant contributions to operations in Somalia. SOF performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces, and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.
Iraq
USSOCOM’s 10th Special Forces Group, elements of JSOC, and CIA/SAD Paramilitary Officers linked up again and were the first to enter Iraq before the invasion. Their efforts organized the Kurdish Peshmerga to defeat Ansar Al Islam in Northern Iraq before the invasion. This battle was for control of a territory in Northeastern Iraq that was completely occupied by Ansar Al Islam, an ally of Al Qaeda. This was a very significant battle and led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated during this battle. Sargat was the only facility of its type discovered in the Iraq war. This battle may have been the Tora Bora of Iraq, but it was a sound defeat for Al Qaeda and their ally Ansar Al Islam. This combined team then led the Peshmerga against Saddam’s Northern Army. This effort kept Saddam’s forces in the north and denied the ability to redeploy to contest the invasion force coming from the south. This effort may have saved the lives of hundreds if not thousands of coalition servicemen and women.
At the launch of the Iraq War, dozens of 12-member Special Forces teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for Scud missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of Navy SEALs seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast. Air Force combat controllers flew combat missions in MC-130H Combat Talon IIs and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. It was notably different from the Persian Gulf War of 1991, where Special Operations forces were mostly kept participating. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders. From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and Al-Qaeda terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions successfully training the Iraqi security forces.
Afghanistan
Global presence
In 2010, special operations forces were deployed in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of 2009. In 2011, SOC spokesman Colonel Tim Nye (Army) was reported to have said that the number of countries with SOC presence would likely reach 120 and that joint training exercises will have been carried out in most or all of those countries during the year. One study identified joint-training exercises in Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mali, Norway, Panama, and Poland in 2010 and also, through mid-year 2011, in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, and Thailand, among other nations. In addition, SOC forces executed the high-profile killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011.
In November 2009, The Nation reported on a covert JSOC/Blackwater anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan.
In 2010, White House counterterrorism director John O. Brennan said that the United States “will not merely respond after the fact” of a terrorist attack but will “take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond.” Olson said, “In some places, in deference to host-country sensitivities, we are lower in profile. In every place, Special Operations forces activities are coordinated with the U.S. ambassador and are under the operational control of the four-star regional commander.”
The conduct of actions by SOC forces outside of Iraq and Afghan war zones has been the subject of internal U.S. debate, including between representatives of the Bush administration such as John B. Bellinger III, on one hand, and the Obama administration on another. The United Nations in 2010 also “questioned the administration’s authority under international law to conduct such raids, particularly when they kill innocent civilians. One possible legal justification – the permission of the country in question – is complicated in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, where the governments privately agree but do not publicly acknowledge approving the attacks,” as one report put it.
In two decades of fighting terrorism, 660 members of the special operation community have been killed and a further 2,738 were wounded.
Subordinate commands
Joint Special Operations Command
Units
The U.S. Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, popularly known as Delta Force, is the first of the two counter-terrorism, special mission units that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command. Modeled after the British Special Air Service, Delta Force is regarded as one of the premier special operations forces in the world. Delta also includes a stringent training and selection process. Delta recruits primarily from the most proficient and highly skilled soldiers of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, although it encompasses the capability of recruiting throughout the U.S. Armed Forces. Recruits must pass a rigid selection course, known as the Operators’ Training Course (OTC), before beginning training. Delta has received training from numerous U.S. government agencies and other tiers one SOF and has created a curriculum based on this training and the techniques it developed. Delta conducts clandestine and covert special operations all over the world. It can conduct myriad special operations missions but specializes in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations.
The Intelligence Support Activity (ISA, Activity) is the support branch of JSOC and USSOCOM. Its primary missions are to provide Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) mainly for Delta and DEVGRU’s operations. Before establishing the Strategic Support Branch in 2001, the ISA required the permission of the CIA to conduct covert operations, which considerably lessened its effectiveness in its support of JSOC operations as a whole.
The U.S. Navy’s Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, SEAL Team Six) is the second of the two counter-terrorism, special mission units that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command. DEVGRU is the U.S. Navy’s counterpart to Delta, specializing in maritime counter-terrorism. DEVGRU recruits the most proficient operators from Naval Special Warfare, specifically the U.S. Navy SEALs. Like Delta, DEVGRU can conduct a variety of special operations missions but trains primarily for maritime counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations. DEVGRU has gained prolific notoriety in recent years due to high-profile hostage rescue operations and their role in the killing of Osama Bin Laden.
The Air Force 24th Special Tactics Squadron (24th STS) is the AFSOC component of JSOC. Comprised of specially selected AFSOC personnel, including Pararescuemen, Combat Controllers, and TACPs, the 24th STS plays a crucial role in supporting JSOC missions. These special operators often work closely with units like Delta Force and DEVGRU, providing essential capabilities such as air control, coordination, and medical assistance. The 24th STS’s ability to synchronize and control different elements of airpower enhances air operations deep in enemy territory, making them invaluable assets in special operations.
The Joint Communications Unit (JCU) is a technical unit within the United States Special Operations Command responsible for standardizing and ensuring interoperability of communication procedures and equipment for the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and its subordinate units. Established at Ft. Bragg, NC in 1980 following the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the JCU plays a critical role in ensuring seamless communication among special operations forces. Known for their expertise and proficiency, the JCU has earned the reputation of being “DoD’s Finest Communicators.”
Portions of JSOC units have been integral parts of various special operations task forces operating in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. Notable among these task forces are Task Force 11, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26, and Task Force 145, which were established as part of the Pentagon’s post-9/11 campaign against terrorism. These task forces quickly became the blueprint for how the military conducted intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency operations. Task Force 121, initially formed in the summer of 2003, was the result of merging two existing Special Operations units. One unit was focused on hunting Osama bin Laden in and around Afghanistan, while the other was tasked with tracking Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities
Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) was transferred to USSOCOM from the United States Joint Forces Command in 2011, shortly before the latter was disestablished. Its primary mission was to provide training to conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) commanders and their staffs to support USSOCOM international engagement training requirements. Additionally, SOC-JC supported the implementation of capability solutions to enhance strategic and operational warfighting readiness and joint interoperability. SOC-JC also had the responsibility of supporting deployed Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Headquarters.
However, the Government Accountability Office reported that SOC-JC was disestablished in 2013, and positions within it were slated to be eliminated by 2014.
Army Special Operations Command
On December 1, 1989, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) was activated as the 16th major Army command. For over 40 years, these special operations forces have served as America’s spearhead for unconventional warfare. USASOC commands units such as the renowned Special Forces (SF), commonly known as the “Green Berets,” as well as the Rangers. Additionally, it oversees lesser-known units including two psychological operations groups, a special aviation regiment, a civil affairs brigade, and a special sustainment brigade.
These units constitute one of USSOCOM’s primary assets for conducting unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations. Their significance has grown as conventional conflicts have become less prevalent and insurgent and guerrilla warfare have increased in complexity.
Name | Headquarters | Structure and purpose |
---|---|---|
1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) |
Fort Liberty , North Carolina | The 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) manages seven special forces groups—the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (ARNG) and 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (ARNG)—that are designed to deploy and execute nine doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, counter-insurgency, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, information operations, counterproliferation of weapon of mass destruction, and security force assistance; each special forces group consists of three to four battalions with a group support company and headquarters company. The command also manages two psychological operations groups—the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) and 8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)—tasked to work with foreign nations to induce or reinforce behavior favorable to U.S. objectives; each psychological operations group consists of three to four battalions, most of which are geographically aligned. The command also manages the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) which enables military commanders and U.S. ambassadors to achieve national objectives by countering adversary control and improving a partner’s control over populations via five geographically focused battalions and the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) that provides combat service support, combat medical support, and intelligence via multiple support operations teams and three battalions. |
1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta |
Ft. Liberty, North Carolina | Elite special operations and counter-terrorism unit under the control of Joint Special Operations Command. |
75th Ranger Regiment |
Fort Moore, Georgia | In addition to a regimental headquarters, a Special Troops Battalion, and a military intelligence battalion, the 75th Ranger Regiment consists of three maneuver battalions of elite airborne infantry specializing in large-scale, joint forcible entry operations while simultaneously executing precision targeting operations raids across the globe. Additional capabilities include special reconnaissance, air assault, and direct action raids seizing key terrain such as airfields, destroying strategic facilities, and capturing or killing the enemies of the Nation. The Regiment also helps develop the equipment, technologies, training, and readiness that bridge the gap between special operations and conventional combat maneuver organizations. |
Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne) |
Ft. Liberty, North Carolina | The Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne) organizes, mans, trains, resources and equips Army special operations aviation units to provide responsive, special operations aviation support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) consisting of five units and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). |
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School |
Ft. Liberty, North Carolina | The SWCS selects and trains Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers consisting of five distinct units and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine: 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on entry level training—, 2nd Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on advanced training—, Special Warfare Medical Group (Airborne)—which is part of the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center—, Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, and David K. Thuma Noncommissioned Officers Academy. |
Units:
The United States Army Special Forces (SF), also known as the Green Berets, are tasked with several doctrinal missions that set them apart within the U.S. military. These missions include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, and counter-terrorism. What makes Special Forces unique is their employment throughout all three stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict, and war. Foreign internal defense (FID) operations, which constitute SF’s primary peacetime mission, involve assisting friendly developing nations by collaborating with their military and police forces. The goal is to enhance their technical skills, promote understanding of human rights issues, and support humanitarian and civic action projects. Special Forces’ capabilities in unconventional warfare provide a valuable military option for tasks that conventional forces may find inappropriate or infeasible. As such, Special Forces are regarded as the U.S. military’s premier unconventional warfare force. Training for SF candidates is extensive and covers a wide range of skills including weapons proficiency, engineering, communications, and medicine. SF soldiers are trained to be proficient warriors first and foremost, but they must also possess the ability to teach and train their team members as well as allies during FID or UW missions. In addition to their primary missions, SF units often undertake collateral activities, which include coalition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian demining, and counter-drug operations. These activities highlight the versatility and adaptability of Special Forces soldiers in addressing a variety of challenges and operational scenarios.
The 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), commonly known as Delta Force, is an elite Special Mission Unit of the United States Army. It operates under the organization of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) but is controlled by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Delta Force is renowned for its expertise in hostage rescue, counterterrorism, direct action, and reconnaissance missions targeting high-value individuals. Within JSOC, Delta Force is often referred to as Task Force Green, among other names such as Combat Applications Group (CAG), “The Unit,” or Army Compartmented Element. Alongside its U.S. Navy counterpart, DEVGRU (SEAL Team 6), Delta Force undertakes some of the most complex and hazardous missions within the U.S. military. These units are recognized as “Tier One” special mission units by the U.S. government, signifying their status as among the most elite and specialized forces available.
The 75th Ranger Regiment, also known as U.S. Army Rangers, serves as the premier light-infantry unit of the United States Army, with its headquarters located at Fort Benning, Georgia. The regiment’s primary mission is to plan and execute special operations in support of U.S. policy and objectives. Renowned for their flexibility and rapid deployment capabilities, each battalion within the 75th Ranger Regiment is capable of deploying to any location worldwide within 18 hours of receiving notice. The Army places significant importance on the training and readiness of the Rangers, who possesses the versatility to undertake both conventional and specialized operations. Rangers are proficient in various infiltration methods, including land, sea, and air, and excel in conducting direct action missions such as raids and assaults on targets such as buildings or airfields. Their expertise and agility make them a highly effective force for a wide range of military operations.
The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers), headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is tasked with providing aviation support to units within the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Comprising MH-6 and AH-6 light helicopters, MH-60 helicopters, and MH-47 heavy assault helicopters, the regiment boasts a diverse fleet tailored to meet various mission requirements. Since its inception in the early 1980s, the 160th SOAR (A) has continually evolved, with a particular emphasis on night operations, earning them the moniker “Night Stalkers.” This specialization in nocturnal operations has become a hallmark of the regiment’s capabilities. The primary mission of the Night Stalkers is to execute overt or covert operations involving infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces across diverse environmental conditions. Whether operating in urban environments or rugged terrain, the Night Stalkers excel in providing critical aviation support to ensure the success of special operations missions conducted by USSOCOM units.
The 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) and the 8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) are specialized units within the United States Army dedicated to using persuasion to influence perceptions and encourage desired behavior. These soldiers, often referred to as PSYOP soldiers, play a crucial role in supporting national objectives at various levels of operations: tactical, operational, and strategic.At the strategic level, PSYOP soldiers engage in operations that advance broad or long-term objectives. These operations are global and may target large audiences or key communicators. They aim to shape attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors on a wide scale to achieve strategic goals. Operational psychological operations are conducted on a smaller scale, focusing on specific target groups within a theater of operations. The 4th POG(A) is employed by theater commanders to influence various groups, ranging from gaining support for U.S. operations to preparing the battlefield for combat. Tactical psychological operations are more immediate and limited in scope, used by commanders to achieve immediate or near-term goals. These operations are designed to impact the morale and efficiency of enemy forces directly, providing a force-enhancing capability to friendly units on the battlefield. Overall, the efforts of PSYOP soldiers contribute to shaping the information environment, influencing perceptions, and ultimately supporting the overall objectives of military operations.
The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) specializes in identifying critical requirements needed by local citizens in both wartime and disaster situations. These specialists play a crucial role in supporting military operations by locating civilian resources to aid in those operations, minimizing civilian interference, and supporting national assistance activities. One of their key functions is to plan and execute noncombatant evacuation operations, ensuring the safety of civilians in conflict zones or areas affected by natural disasters. Additionally, they support counter-drug operations by leveraging their knowledge of local communities and resources. In times of conflict or instability, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade establishes and maintains liaison with civilian aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations, facilitating coordination and cooperation between military and civilian entities. This collaboration enhances the effectiveness of relief efforts and contributes to overall mission success. Furthermore, in support of special operations, these culturally oriented and linguistically capable soldiers may provide functional expertise for foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare operations, and direct action missions. Their ability to understand local cultures and languages makes them valuable assets in these complex and sensitive operations, where effective interaction with indigenous populations is crucial.
The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) (SO) (A) plays a vital role in supporting the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) by providing essential services across various domains such as signal, intelligence, medical, and logistical support. Specializing in supporting Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), the brigade’s soldiers are trained to deliver critical services that enable ARSOF to effectively “shoot, move, and communicate” in demanding operational environments. This includes providing communications infrastructure, focused intelligence gathering, and medical Role II support to ensure the health and readiness of ARSOF personnel. Additionally, the 528th Sustainment Brigade (SO) (A) is responsible for supplying ARSOF units with the necessary equipment, maintenance, and logistical support needed to sustain continuous operations. This includes managing specialized equipment unique to ARSOF units, requiring soldiers to be proficient in operating and maintaining a wide range of specialized gear not typically used by conventional forces. Furthermore, the brigade offers centralized and integrated material management services, overseeing property management, equipment maintenance, logistical automation, and the distribution of repair parts and supplies. This centralized approach ensures efficient resource allocation and support for USASOC’s mission requirements.
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWCS) trains USSOCOM and Army Special Operations Forces through the development and evaluation of special operations concepts, doctrines, and training.
Marine Forces Special Operations Command
In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense mandated the establishment of the United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), which serves as the Marine Corps component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Initially envisioned as a unit comprising approximately 2500 Marines to operate within USSOCOM, MARSOC was officially activated on February 24, 2006, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
At its inception, MARSOC consisted of a small staff and the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), later redesignated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG), which was formed to conduct foreign internal defense operations. As a service component of USSOCOM, MARSOC is entrusted with the training, organization, equipping, and deployment of responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces globally, in support of combatant commanders and other agencies.
MARSOC has been assigned various missions by the Commander USSOCOM, including foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance. Additionally, MARSOC has been tasked with developing capabilities in unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, and information operations. The first MARSOC units were deployed in August 2006, just six months after the group’s initial activation, and MARSOC achieved full operational capability in October 2008.
Units
- Marine Raider Regiment (Marine Raiders) consists of a Headquarters Company and three Marine Raider Battalions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Regiment provides tailored military combat-skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces to enhance their tactical capabilities and to prepare the environment as directed by USSOCOM as well as the capability to form the nucleus of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. Marines and Sailors of the MRR train, advise, and assist friendly host nation forces – including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces – to enable them to support their governments’ internal security and stability, to subversion, and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats. MRR deployments are coordinated by MARSOC, through USSOCOM, by engagement priorities for Overseas Contingency Operations.
- Marine Raider Support Group (MRSG) trains, equips, structures, and provides specially qualified Marine forces, including, operational logistics, intelligence, Military Working Dogs, Firepower Control Teams, and communications support to sustain worldwide special operations missions as directed by the Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC).
- Marine Raider Training Center (MRTC) performs the screening, recruiting, training, assessment, and doctrinal development functions for MARSOC. It includes two subordinate Special Missions Training Branches (SMTBs), one on each coast.
The United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM, NAVSOC, or NSWC) was established on April 16, 1987, at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in San Diego as the Naval component of the United States Special Operations Command. NAVSPECWARCOM serves as the guiding authority providing vision, leadership, doctrinal guidance, resources, and oversight to ensure that component special operations forces are prepared to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.
Today, NAVSPECWARCOM oversees the operations of SEAL Teams and Special Boat Teams, which are the elite combat units of Naval Special Warfare. These teams are meticulously organized, trained, and equipped to execute a wide range of missions, including direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and support for psychological and civil affairs operations. Their highly skilled operators are deployed globally in support of National Command Authority objectives, frequently collaborating with both conventional and special operations forces from other branches of the military.
Units
- The United States Navy SEALs are renowned for their exceptional individual reliability, collective discipline, and high level of skill as a special operations force. What sets Navy SEALs apart from other military units is their specialization in maritime operations, operating both in and from the sea. The acronym SEAL stands for Sea, Air, and Land, reflecting the environments in which they are trained to operate. Navy SEALs excel in direct action and special reconnaissance missions, leveraging their expertise in stealth and clandestine operations to execute multiple missions against targets that would be difficult for larger forces to approach undetected. Due to the inherent risks involved in their missions, prospective SEALs undergo what is widely regarded as one of the most rigorous training programs in the world. Overall, Navy SEALs are known for their versatility, adaptability, and ability to execute missions with precision and effectiveness in some of the most challenging environments and conditions imaginable.
- Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), referred to as SEAL Team Six, is the name of its predecessor which was officially disbanded in 1987.
- SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams are SEAL teams with an added underwater delivery capability who use the SDV MK VIII and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), submersibles that provide NSW with an unprecedented capability that combines the attributes of clandestine underwater mobility and the combat swimmer.
- Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) operate and maintain state-of-the-art vessels and high-tech equipment to conduct coastal patrol and interdiction and support special operations missions. Focusing on infiltration and exfiltration of SEALs and other SOF, SWCCs provide dedicated rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate. They also bring to the table a unique SOF capability: Maritime Combatant Craft Aerial Delivery System—the ability to deliver combat craft via parachute drop. Like SEALs, SWCCs must have excellent physical fitness, be highly motivated, combat-focused, and responsive in high-stress situations.
Air Force Special Operations Command
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) was established on May 22, 1990, with its headquarters located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. As one of the 10 Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOMs), AFSOC serves as the Air Force component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is responsible for both operational and administrative oversight of subordinate special operations wings and groups within the regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard.
AFSOC’s primary mission is to provide Air Force special operations forces for deployment and assignment to regional unified commands around the world. These special operations forces are comprised of highly trained airmen who are rapidly deployable and capable of conducting a wide range of missions, including precision airstrikes, close air support, infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and refueling of special operations elements.
One of AFSOC’s distinctive capabilities is its ability to conduct airborne radio and television broadcasts for psychological operations, as well as providing aviation foreign internal defense instructors to assist other governments in developing their military capabilities.
The core missions of AFSOC encompass battlefield air operations, agile combat support, aviation foreign internal defense, information operations, precision aerospace fires, psychological operations, specialized air mobility, specialized refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. These missions highlight AFSOC’s diverse and critical contributions to both national defense and global security.
Components
- Combat Controllers (CCT) are ground combat forces specialized in a traditional pathfinder role while having a heavy emphasis on simultaneous air traffic control, fire support (via airstrikes, close air support and command, control, and communications in covert or austere environments.
- Pararescuemen (PJ) is the only Department of Defense specialty specifically trained and equipped to conduct conventional and unconventional personnel recovery operations. A PJ’s primary function is as a personnel recovery specialist with emergency trauma medical capabilities in humanitarian and combat environments.
- Special Reconnaissance (SR) conducts long-range interdiction, surveillance, and intelligence gathering. A subset of their responsibilities is to assess and interpret weather and environmental intelligence from forward-deployed locations, working alongside special operations forces.
Organization
- The 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Its mission focus is unconventional warfare: counter-terrorism, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, psychological operations, aviation assistance to developing nations, “deep battlefield” resupply, interdiction, and close air support. The wing’s core missions include aerospace surface interface, agile combat support, combat aviation advisory operations, information operations, personnel recovery/recovery operations, precision aerospace fires, psychological operations dissemination, specialized aerospace mobility, and specialized aerial refueling. Among its aircraft is the MC-130 Combat Talon II, a low-level terrain-following special missions transport that can evade radar detection and slip into enemy territory at a 200-foot (61 m) altitude for infiltration/exfiltration missions, even in zero visibility, dropping off or recovering men or supplies with pinpoint accuracy. It also operates the AC-130 Spooky and Spectre gunships that provide highly accurate airborne gunfire for close air support of conventional and special operations forces on the ground.
- The 24th Special Operations Wing (24 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. It is composed of the 720th Special Tactics Group, 724th Special Tactics Group, Special Tactics Training Squadron, and 16 recruiting locations across the United States. The Special Tactics Squadrons, under the 720th STG and 724th STG, are made up of Special Tactics Officers, Combat Controllers, Combat Rescue Officers, Pararescuemen, Special Operations Weather Officers and Airmen, Air Liaison Officers, Tactical Air Control Party operators, and some combat support airmen which comprise 58 Air Force specialties.
- The 27th Special Operations Wing (27 SOW) is located at Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Its primary mission includes infiltration, exfiltration, and re-supply of special operations forces; air refueling of special operations rotary wing and tiltrotor aircraft; and precision fire support. These capabilities support a variety of special operations missions including direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, personnel recovery, psychological operations, and information operations.
- The 193d Special Operations Wing (193 SOW) is an Air National Guard (ANG) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC and located at Harrisburg International Airport/Air National Guard Station (former Olmsted Air Force Base), Pennsylvania. Under Title 32 USC, the 193 SOW performs state missions for the Governor of Pennsylvania as part of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. Under Title 10 USC, the 193 SOW is part of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) of the United States Air Force. Its primary wartime and contingency operations mission as an AFSOC-gained unit is psychological operations (PSYOP). The 193 SOW is unique in that it is the only unit in the U.S. Air Force to fly and maintain the Lockheed EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft.
- The 919th Special Operations Wing (919 SOW) is an Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC and located at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Field #3/Duke Field, Florida. The 919 SOW flies and maintains the MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow special operations aircraft designed for covert operations.
- The 352d Special Operations Wing (352 SOW) at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom serves as the core to the United States European Command’s standing Joint Special Operations Air Component headquarters. The squadron provides support for three flying squadrons, one special tactics squadron and one maintenance squadron for exercise, logistics, and war planning; aircrew training; communications; aerial delivery; medical; intelligence; security and force protection; weather; information technologies and transformation support and current operations.
- The 353d Special Operations Group (353 SOG) is the focal point for all U.S. Air Force special operations activities throughout the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater. Headquartered at Kadena AB, Okinawa, Japan the group is prepared to conduct a variety of high-priority, low-visibility missions. Its mission is air support of joint and allied special operations forces in the Pacific. It maintains a worldwide mobility commitment, participates in Pacific theater exercises as directed, and supports humanitarian and relief operations.
- The United States Air Force Special Operations School (USAFSOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida is a primary support unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command. The USAFSOS prepares special operations Airmen to successfully plan, organize, and execute global special operations by providing indoctrination and education for AFSOC, other USSOCOM components, and joint/interagency/ coalition partners.
Space Force Special Operations Command
As of October 2023, the United States Space Force has not announced the formation of a Special Operations Commander. However, in July of 2023, the United States Space Force assigned Col. Stephan Cummings as an “Element Commander” to U.S. Special Operations Command. As of October 2023, the United States Space Force has not announced any heraldry for Space Force Special Operations Command, though Space Force members attached to U.S. Special Operations Command have been seen wearing patches that say “U.S. Space Forces– Special Operations Command.”
Order of battle
Special Operations Command order of battle April 2020 (click to enlarge)
List of commanders
The commander of U.S. Special Operations Command is a statutory office (10 U.S.C. § 167), and is held by a four-star general or admiral.
USSOCOM medal
USSOCOM Medal Ribbon Bar
The United States Special Operations Command Medal was introduced in 1994 to recognize individuals for outstanding contributions to, and in support of, special operations. Some notable recipients include;
- Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson
- Colonel Ralph Puckett
- SCPO Chris Beck
Since it was created, there have been more than 50 recipients, only six of whom were not American, including;
- General Benoît Puga (France)
- Kaptein Gunnar Sønsteby, 2008 (Norway)
- † Generał broni Włodzimierz Potasiński, 2010 (Poland)
- Generał dywizji Piotr Patalong, 2014 (Poland)
- Generał brygady Jerzy Gut, 2014 (Poland)
- Jungjang (Lieutenant General) Chun In-bum, 2016 (Republic of Korea)
(† posthumously)
References
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